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ABSTRACT
 
An archival study of 100 files of dissolution of marriage
 
granted between January 1983 and December 1988 in three
 
Southern California county courthouses explored factors
 
affecting the likelihood of paternal custodial challenges in
 
divorce cases. Based on a review of the literature of
 
domestic violence that details battering, men's needs for
 
control and domination, it was hypothesized that batterers
 
would be more likely to institute and win custodial
 
challehgeSf be in arrears in suppbrt payments, and fight for
 
male children who are of schobl-age than they would be to
 
fight for female children or preschool age children of
 
either sex. It was further hypothesized that domestically
 
violent men earning a higher income would be more likely to
 
persist in custodial disputes by initiating court
 
appearances as a way to continue the control and harassment
 
of their wives, whereas domestically violent men with a
 
lower income would continue attempting to physically abuse
 
their wives after separation. Data gathered from
 
dissolution files included person filing for divorce,
 
history of restraining orders, custody requested and
 
awarded, and type of visitation granted. Amount of support,
 
arrearages, length of time dispute lasted, and demographic
 
data was also recorded.
 
Ill
 
The results that emerged indicated issues of control
 
such that violent fathers were more likely to fight for
 
custody of male children, be in arrears in support payments,
 
and persist in initiating court appearances when earning a
 
higher income than were nonviolent fathers. Violent fathers
 
were also found to be as likely as nonviolent fathers to win
 
custody of their children.
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: XNTRpDUCTIOrf.;' -u',/: ■: 
Prevalence of Domestic Violence in the United States 
The existence of violence against women was ignored by 
social scientists until 1971. At this time, journal 
articles and conferences regarding domestic violence began 
to emerge (Gelles, 1974; O'Brien, 1971; pteinmetz! & Straus, 
1974). Due to the efforts of grassroots activists and 
scholars, battering is now recognized as an extensive social 
problem (Tierney, 1982). The prevalence of domestic 
violence in our society has been established by several 
studies. Walker (1979) estimated that 50% of all married 
women in the United States were or would be battered in 
marriage. Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) estimated a 
domestic violence rate of 50 to 60% based on a 29% reported 
rate. Levinger (1966) looked at sources of marital 
dissatisfaction among applications for divorce and found a 
50% domestic violence incidence rate. The National Crime 
Survey of 1976 found that one-fourth of all assaults against 
women who had ever been married are committed by their 
husbands or ex-husbands (Gacquin, 1978) . 
Cvcle of Violence 
When conducting research in areas involving domestic 
violence, it is important to look at the cycle of violence 
in order to understand the dynamics involved in a battering 
relationship. Langen & Innes (1986) reported that 32% of 
been abused during an average six-month
 
period following the initial abusive incident. These repeat
 
victims accounted for 57% of detected incidents of domestic
 
violence over a four-year period. Bern (1982) tracked abuse
 
from a single violent incident to a cyclical pattern between
 
partners. Walker (1979, 1989) describes the cycle of
 
violence as a tension-building phase, followed by the acute
 
battering incident> t calm period afterward.
 
Deschner (1984) describes the cycle of violence as
 
having seven stages; mutual dependence, the noxious event,
 
coercions exchanged, the "last straw" decision, primitive
 
rage, reinforcement for battering when the victim is
 
silenced, and repentance.
 
Mack (1989) emphasizes the systematic nature of the
 
feedback loop, which leads to the "last straw" decision and
 
reinforcement for battering when the victim is silenced.
 
Mack adds two more stages: feelings of rejection and
 
abandonment on the part of the abuser, which fuel the anger,
 
and fear in the abused partner following the violent
 
episode.
 
Generally, cycles are completed once or twice a year
 
initially. Gradually, the cycles become more frequent until
 
they occur within a period of a few weeks.
 
Incidence of Child Abuse bv Wife Batterers
 
When investigating the area of domestic violence, an
 
apparent question with regard to the children of these
 
relationships arises. Specifically, one asks if the
 
violence is isolated to the husband-wife dyad or if it
 
consequently diffuses to the Children. Studies indicate
 
that men who batter their wives tend to abuse their children
 
physically, sexually, and psychologically (Straus & Gelles,
 
1990; Pagelow, 1982; Gaylord, 1975). Because data on child
 
abuse are based on official reports which are filed
 
differently in each state, they do not always indicate
 
severity and kind of abuse involved. Also, they do not
 
always indicate the abuser's sex or define abuse in
 
psychologically complex ways. Because of this, true
 
statistics on child abuse are not available. The latest
 
national survey of the incidence of reported child abuse and
 
neglect conducted by the National Center on Child abuse and
 
Neglect found that there were 16.3 cases of maltreatment per
 
1,000 children in the population in 1986 (National Center on
 
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1988).
 
Studies on paternal child abuse are also difficult to
 
find. Chase (1975) found that a mother and stepmother was
 
the abuser in 50% of the incidents and the father and
 
stepfather in about 40% of the incidents. Others were
 
caretakers, siblings, or unrelated perpetrators. However,
 
she noted fathers had a higher involvement rate than
 
mothers. Two-thirds of the incidents in the homes where
 
fathers or stepfathers were present were committed by the
 
father or stepfather, while in homes with mothers or
 
stepmothers, the mothers and stepmothers were perpetrators
 
in less than half of the incidents that took place.
 
Additional studies have investigated the incidence of
 
woman batterers abusing their children. Gaylord (1975)
 
conducted a pteliminary survey of 100 cases of
 
wifebattering. He found that 54% of the husbands in his
 
study beat both their children and their wives.
 
Pagelow (1982) studied 306 battered mothers between
 
1977 and 1980. She found that 76% of these mothers reported
 
that their children were victims of paternal violence, one-

half of them beaten along with their mothers and one-half of
 
them separately.
 
Roy (1977) conducted a study of 150 battered women.
 
She found that 45% of the assaults on the women were
 
accompanied by similar physical assaults on at least one
 
child in the home. The remaining 55% were situations in
 
which the children were not assaulted, but were witnesses to
 
the attacks on their mothers. She also found that 95% of
 
the mothers did not report their husbands to authorities for
 
child abuse for fear of reprisals and counter charges by the
 
husbands against the wives.
 
Walker (1979) studied the effects of battering on women
 
through interviews with battered women. She found that one­
third of the men who battered their wives also abused their
 
children.
 
a national survey of 3,520 families conducted in
 
1985, Straus & Gelles (1990) found that in families where
 
the husband had hit his wife during the year, the incidence
 
of child abuse was 150% greater than in other families.
 
They also found that husbands who were verbally aggressive
 
to their spouses had a significantly higher child abuse rate
 
as compared to husbands that were not. In addition, they
 
found that fathers who had been hit at age 13 by their own
 
fathers exhibited a significantly higher rate of child abuse
 
than those fathers who had not.
 
Profile of the Batterer
 
In order to understand the forces at work and the
 
underlying causes of domestic violence, it is necessary to
 
consider the profile of the batterer. Several studies have
 
addressed this issue. Elbow (1977) had found that the
 
abusive male tends to project blame for mental strife onto
 
his wife, experiences her as an extension of his mother or
 
some significant other, and demands that she meet his rigid
 
expectations of marriage. He is incapable of intimacy,
 
although he can offer warmth, protection, and security to
 
his wife. Elbow also noted that often the abuser witnessed
 
his father assaulting his mother as a child.
 
Straus (1978), in a study of over 2000 adults found the
 
higher the stress score, the higher the rate of assault
 
between husband and wife, and that family violence was also
 
related to the husband's dominance. He found that men who
 
assault their wives believe that physical punishment of
 
children and slapping of a spouse are appropriate behavior.
 
It was concluded that men who believe that husbands should
 
be the dominant person in a marriage, and esj)ecially if they
 
had actually achieved such a power position, had assault
 
rates from one and one-half to three times higher than men
 
without these values who were under stress.
 
Frieze (1979) reported similar findings from
 
interviewing battered women as compared to nonbattered
 
women. She concluded that violent marriages are
 
characterized by high husband dominance and the use by
 
husbands of coercive power.
 
Results of an analysis conducted by Straus and Gelles
 
(1990) on data gathered from Straus's 1975 National Family
 
Violence Survey help to explain the etiolbgical yariabresbf
 
child abuse and wife beating. Results showed that the more
 
physical punishment was experienced by the husbahds, the
 
higher was the rate of violence against wives. Moreover,
 
this applied to infrequent as well as frequent violent
 
attacks, and also ordinary violence that is so frequent in
 
marriages.
 
A number of other studies have attempted to determine
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specific characteristics which are descriptive of spouse
 
abusers. The various research has found that low self-

esteem (Cantoni, 1981); lack of self-control (Cantoni,
 
1981); blaming others for one's actions (Walker, 1979);
 
social isolation (Cantoni, 1981); rigidity (Elbow, 1982);
 
and distress (Cantoni, 1981; Ponzeti, Gate, & Koval, 1981;
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Walker, 1979) are all characteristics of batterers.
 
Social and Historical Theorv of Domestic Violence
 
Other social scientists assert that it is important to
 
study the social and historical relationships within the
 
family to reveal the meaning and purpose behind battering.
 
They stress the importance of men choosing women and
 
children as targets of battering. The fact that men do this
 
only in their homes to regain what they believe is their
 
rightful control of the situation is also of significance.
 
According to this view, the male-dominated culture in which
 
violence has been institutionalized perpetuate the incidence
 
of battering (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Rowbotham, 1973;
 
Schechter, 1982; Weitzman, 1976).
 
Yllo and Straus (1984) looked at the relationship
 
between the rates of wife beating in American states and the
 
degree to which each state is characterized by a patriarchal
 
social structure and patriarchal family norms. Their
 
results indicated a curvilinear relationship between
 
patriarchal structure and the rate of wife beating such that
 
wife beating was found to be highest in those states where
 
structural inequality in ecoriGmic, educatiohai> political,
 
and legal inistitutions was greatest. As the status of woitien
 
imprdvedv violence declined to a point, such that in the
 
states where women's status was the highest, the rate of
 
wife beating was also very high. A linear association
 
between patriarchal family norms and wife beating was also
 
found such that states with male-dominant norms had twice as
 
much wife beating as states with more egalitarian norms.
 
Additionally, they found an interaction between structural
 
and normative factors in their impact on rates of wife
 
beating. Wife beating was found most common in a context
 
where women's status in economics, educational, legal, and
 
political institutions was relatively high but where
 
prevailing norms favored their subordination within
 
marriage.
 
Rewards of Intimate Violence
 
Family members hit one another because they can with
 
few negative consequences. In addition, there are rewards
 
for exhibiting violent behavior. The rewards are often
 
immediate. The husband hits the wife because the effects
 
are immediate, powerful, he feels in control, and his wife
 
often responds by altering her behavior in a way that
 
reinforces him. Using violence can be a rewarding method of
 
working off anger or frustration for a person seeking
 
immediate gratification.
 
Power, control, and self-aggrandizement are additional
 
rewards of family violence. Goode (1971) has proposed that
 
force or its threat is an underlying element in all social
 
systems, because all social systems are, to a certain
 
extent, power systems. Force or violence is proposed to be
 
one of four major sets of resources by which people can
 
induce others to obtain their desired outcomes. The four
 
sets of resources include; economic factors (giving or
 
withholding economic rewards or services); prestige or
 
respect; likability, attractiveness, friendship, or love;
 
and, force and its threat. One can exert influence on
 
people using any of these systems. All of these factors are
 
at work within the family, and all are used because they can
 
effectively control the behavior of loved ones.
 
The consequences of intimate violence further increase
 
the rewards for an individual whose goal is to control
 
another. Chronic violence tends to wear victims to a
 
condition in which they will do anything to appease their
 
batterers and avoid violence. For the individual exerting
 
control, the reward is not only control or power, but self-

esteem as well. Maintaining control of a situation
 
increases one's self-esteem and sense of self-worth,
 
especially one whose self-esteem may have been damaged by
 
experiences outside of the home.
 
An additional reward for hitting is revenge. One who
 
feels their self-worth has been attacked or threatened may
 
seek revenge as when conflict escalates and each intimate
 
throws out the other's vulnerabilities, violence may be used
 
as a defense.
 
Social control probably serves to deter violence in
 
most situations. Minor hitting usually does not escalate
 
into abuse. When abuse does occur, it is usually due to any
 
of several factors, including low social control due to high
 
stress, frustration, social isolation, and beliefs that
 
hitting is an appropriate method to control wives and
 
children.
 
Consequences to Women Upon Leaving the Abusive Relationship
 
In conjunction with the historical and social
 
explanation for battering, a modest amount of research has
 
dealt with the consequences suffered by women after leaving
 
an abusive spouse. Chesler (1986) asserts that mothers have
 
been custodially challenged when they accused their husbands
 
of child neglect, child abuse, and incest. Accusations of
 
wife battering, demands for alimony, child support, or the
 
marital home have also prompted custodial challenges by
 
fathers against mothers. Chesler reviewed studies of
 
American custody battles throughout the 1970's and 1980•s.
 
She found that they tend to confirm that fathers custodially
 
challenged mothers, that many fathers won judicial custody.
 
arranged paternal custody privately, or won "kidnapping"
 
custody of their children.
 
Weitzman and Dixori (1981) found that 63% of the fathers
 
in Los Angeles who fought for custody succeeded in 1977*
 
They revealed that although 90% of all mothers seeking
 
divorce were granted custody, with an increase in divorce,
 
the actual number of fathers receiving custody increased
 
Additional studies have found other negative effects on
 
women and children as a result of divorce. Weitzman and
 
Dixon (1981) found that divorce forces mothers and children
 
into poverty. Most fathers don't pay child support, and
 
most courts won't order adequate or enforceable amounts of
 
child support from fathers.
 
Chesler (1986) conducted an extensive study of 60
 
mothers being custodially challenged from 1960-1981 by
 
taping interviews, reading and analyzing each mother's trial
 
manuscript, legal deposition, psychiatric report, and
 
relevant private correspondence. She also interviewed
 
custodially embattled, custodial, and noncustodial fathers
 
which she used to confirm her findings of the maternal
 
interviews. Five of these men had been married to five of
 
the maternal interviewees and 30 were fathers' rights
 
activists. Although 87% of the maternal interviewees had
 
never worked full time or at careers once they married, 77%
 
of the judicially successful and 69% of the privately
 
successful fathers refused to pay any kind of child support
 
prior to obtaining custody^ She also found that 62% of the
 
custodial fathers physically abused their wives, 57% engaged
 
in anti-mother brainwashing campaigns, 37% kidnapped their
 
children, and 3% were incestuous fathers.
 
All of the mothers in Chesler's study had
 
psychologically bonded with their children and were their
 
primary caregivers. Of the custodial fathers, 87% did no
 
housework or primary child care, and only 12% helped out
 
occasionally by babysitting.
 
In spite of the above circumstances, Chesler found that
 
70% of the judges ordered children into custody of the
 
fathers, and 70% of the private arrangements also resulted
 
in paternal custody. Within two years, 82% of all custody
 
battles resulted in paternal custody. The 30% of mothers
 
who initially won custody were married to less physically
 
abusive husbands.
 
The fathers in her study fought for custody for a
 
minimum of eight reasons in addition to loving their
 
children. Of these reasons, 67% of the fathers had an
 
economic motive such as maintaining the marital home for
 
themselves, and some wanted to escape paying child and
 
spousal support. Nearly two-thirds of the fathers fought
 
for custody of children as a way to punish their wives.
 
They believed wifely disobedience (such as returning to
 
school or work) or obtaining a divorce was a form of
 
maternal unfitness. Approximately 23% believed they were
 
superior parents and needed their children to be their
 
"obedient inferiors, as domestic servants, and personal-

genetic allies" (Chesler, 1986, p. 78). Also, 25% fought
 
for custody because they or their second wives were
 
infertile.
 
Purpose of the Present Study
 
Presently no current data can be located on the number
 
of domestically violent men obtaining custody in the general
 
population. There is also a lack of studies available on
 
the relationship between men who are domestically violent
 
custodially challenging mothers and winning custody of their
 
chiidren. Therefore, the present study is intended to
 
determine if such a pattern exists.
 
A review of the literature indicates that the male who
 
is domestically violent tends to believe that he should be
 
the dominant figure in the family and that his wife and
 
children are his property. He also has a tendency to be
 
rigid and to blame others for his actions. For these
 
reasons, it is hypothesized that men who are domestically
 
violent are more likely fo fight for custody of their
 
children than those who are not. Also, because studies have
 
found an increasing tendency for fathers who seek custody of
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 their children to reGeive custody/ it is hypothesized that
 
domestically vidlent fathers who fight for ctistpdy are more
 
likely to win custody of their qhildren due to their
 
persistence to regain control.
 
It could be asked if there are certain conditions in
 
which it is more favorable for fathers to fight for custody.
 
Chesler (1986) found that the average age of all children
 
when a battle began was nine years. The average age of the
 
youngest child when a battle began was six years. She
 
concluded that fathers fought for children who had been
 
toilet-trained, verbal, of school age, and male.
 
Because there is little information available on the
 
ages or sex of children involved in custody battles between
 
their parents, this study will attempt to determine the
 
average youngest age and sex of children in such custody
 
Chesler (1986) also found that the majority of fathers
 
who fought for custody did so because they did not want to
 
give financial support to their ex-wives. She also
 
determined that the majority of fathers who were successful
 
in obtaining custody of their children failed to pay any
 
child or spousal support prior to winning custody. The
 
present study will attempt to see if there is a tendency for
 
fathers that are domestically violent to be in arrears more
 
so than fathers that are not domestically violent.
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Luepnitz (1982) conducted a study of joint custody.
 
She found that sole and joint custodial fathers fought long,
 
hard, and bitterly to win custody and had higher incomes,
 
more support systems, and less of a problem maintaining
 
authority with children than did sole or joint custodial
 
mothers. ' /
 
Chesler (1986) also found that money played an
 
important role in paternal custodial success. Economic
 
power allowed fathers to maintain persistence in their legal
 
battles for an extensive period of time without suffering
 
any economic hardships. The fathers in her study earned
 
five times as much income as the mothers earned. In
 
contrast, paternal withholding of support eventually
 
devastated the maternal-child unit, economically and
 
psychologically. The custodial battles lasted an average of
 
three years, 62% of which included fathers who had been
 
domestically violent.
 
While the Chesler data is impressive, her sample is
 
relatively small and the selection process was not random.
 
The present study will be conducted using files on
 
dissolution of marriage from courthouse records. In this
 
way, data gathered will tend to be more objective and basic
 
statistics on incidence in the general population can also
 
be determined.
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Hypotheses
 
The present study was conducted to view the overall
 
differences between faxailies involved in dissolution of
 
marriage where violence had occurred versus those in which
 
violence had not occurred. Specifically, there were eight
 
hypotheses.
 
1. It was hypothesized that fathers who are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to fight for
 
custody of their children than fathers who are not
 
domestically violent.
 
2. It was hypothesized that fathers who are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to win custody of
 
their children than fathers who are not domestically violent
 
when custody is contested.
 
3. It was hypothesized that the older the age of the
 
youngest child at the time of separation, the more likely it
 
would be for fathers to fight for custody of their children.
 
4. It was hypothesized that violent fathers would be
 
more likely to fight for custody of male children than
 
female children as compared to nonviolent fathers.
 
5. It was hypothesized that violent fathers would be
 
more likely to be granted custody of male children than
 
female children as compared to nonviolent fathers.
 
6. It was hypothesized that fathers who are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to be in arrears
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in support payments than fathers who are not domestically
 
violent.
 
7. It was hypothesized that men who are domestically
 
violent earning a higher income, will be more likely to
 
persist in initiating court appearances.
 
8. It was hypothesized that domestically violent men,
 
earning a lower income, would be more likely to continue to
 
harass their wives in more physically abusive ways after
 
separation.
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METHOD
 
File Selection
 
Dissolution files were the data base for the study.
 
Sample files were randomly chosen from courthouse records of
 
dissolution of marriage. Three courthouses were sampled,
 
one from each of three Southern California counties; 45
 
files from Pomona Superior Court in Los Angeles County, 33
 
files from Riverside Superior Court in Riverside County, and
 
22 files from San Bernardino Superior Court in San
 
Bernardino County. Files beginning with January 1983
 
through December 1988 were selected and coded. Files with
 
no minor children were eliminated from consideration. A
 
total sample of 100 files from all three courthouses were
 
selected.
 
Data Collection
 
The researcher conducted the coding. Data on each file
 
was recorded on a card (see Figure 1). One data card was
 
used for each file. Each data card requested identical
 
information from each file. This information was recorded
 
when available in the file.
 
Information requested on the data card included the
 
courthouse the sample was taken from, date proceedings
 
began, file number, the name and gender of the judge, and
 
person initiating the dissolution of marriage. The issuance
 
of a restraining order is usually the only evidence of
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Figure 1. Data Card.
 
File # : Date of Separation
 
Courthouse Length of Marriage
 
Judge (M) (F) Date proceedings began
 
Who Petitioned Children: # of F # of M
 
Mother Request Custody Ages of F Children
 
Legal: Sole Joint Ages of M Children
 
Physical: Sole; Joint Age of Mother
 
Father Request Custody Age of Father
 
Legal: Sole Joint Mother employed?
 
Physical: Sole Joint Occupation
 
Income _____
 
Father employed?
 
Occupation ^ 
 
Income ■ 
Custody Awarded:
 
Legal: Sole Joint (Mother, Father)
 
Physical: Sole Joint (Mother, Father)
 
# of additional court proceedings
 
Who initiated proceedings
 
Purpose . .
 
Result
 
Type of visitation awarded to noncustodial parent
 
Amount of Child Support Ordered
 
Amount of Spousal Support Ordered
 
Amount in arrears
 
Length of time dispute lasted
 
Request for TRO?
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Who requested TRO?
 
TRO granted? :
 
Why was TRO granted _
 
History of violende?
 
Corroborating Evidence?
 
# of abusive incidents prior to separation
 
# of abusive incidents after separation ^
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allegations of domestic violence in a family law file. A
 
request for a restraining order is usually accompanied by a
 
declaration filed by the party requesting such an order. In
 
addition, police reports and incident reports are referred
 
to in the declarations for further proof of need for
 
protection. Therefore, information on whether a restraining
 
order was requested, who requested it, who it was granted
 
to, and why it was requested was recorded. Also noted was
 
who requested and who was awarded custody, along with the
 
amount and type of visitation ordered to the noncustodial
 
parent. Information on the amount of child and spousal
 
support, whether support was in arrears, and if so, the
 
amount in arrears was collected. The total length of time
 
the dispute lasted, number of abusive incidents prior to
 
separation (if listed), number of abusive incidents after
 
separation, additional court proceedings that occurred, and
 
the person initiating the court proceedings, as well as the
 
nature of the proceeding was also recorded.
 
Basic demographic data recorded consisted of the ages
 
of each woman, man, and child at the time dissolution began;
 
number of children; sex of each child; employment status,
 
type of employment, and income of each woman and man, if
 
applicable; length of marriage, and, date of separation.
 
Procedure
 
Three courthouses were sampled: Pomona in Los Angeles
 
County, Riverside in Riverside County, and San Bernardino in
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San Bernardino County. A total of 100 files on dissolution
 
of marriage from the courthouses were sampled. Files in
 
Oach courthouse were kept in numerical order with numbers
 
assigned according to the time in which a couple filed for
 
dissolution. Files were chosen at random using a computer
 
generated random numbers table, starting with the month of
 
January 1983 through December 1988 by going through
 
dissolution of marriage files and extracting only those in
 
which children were involved. The average incidence rate
 
per year of dissolution cases filed in each courthouse was
 
determined. Files were then chosen randomly such that an
 
equal number of files were utilized each year totaling 100
 
for the entire six year period that was studied. If a file
 
was extracted in which there were no minor children
 
involved, the file was not used. Another file number was
 
randomly selected for that year. All information requested
 
on the data cards was then recorded for each file, if
 
available.
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RESULTS
 
All analyses were performed using SPSSPC 4.0. The
 
basic descriptive statistics on all of the variables are
 
presented by father type in Table 1. Table 2 presents the
 
means and standard deviations of the demographic variables
 
of the sample.
 
Paternal Custodial Disputes
 
The Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 3, was
 
run on the data to test the hypothesis that fathers that are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to fight for
 
custody of their children than fathers that are not
 
domestically violent. Results yielded a significant
 
relationship between violent fathers and paternal custodial
 
disputes, (1) = 16.22, p = .00005. As may be seen from
 
Table 3, violent fathers were significantly more likely to
 
fight for custody than were nonviolent fathers.
 
Paternal Custodial Decisions
 
To test the hypothesis that fathers who are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to win custody of
 
their children than fathers who are not domestically
 
violent, a Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 4,
 
was performed. Results did not yield a significant
 
relationship between violent fathers and paternal custodial
 
decisions, x^ (1) = .123, p. = .726. As may be seen from
 
Table 4, 16 violent fathers were granted custody of their
 
children, while 15 nonviolent fathers were awarded custody.
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Table 1
 
Description of Sample by Father Type
 
Domestically 

Violent 

Fathers 

Number of Fathers 49
 
Number of Fathers
 
Contesting Custody 37
 
Number of Fathers
 
Granted Custody 16
 
Number of Fathers in
 
Arrears 26
 
Number of Fathers in
 
Arrears Contesting Custody 21
 
Number of Sons Involved
 
in Disputes 40
 
Number of Daughters
 
Involved in Disputes 30
 
Number of Sons in Paternal
 
Custodial Awards 19
 
Number of Daughters in
 
Paternal Custodial Awards 15
 
Non-

Domestically
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
51
 
18
 
15
 
10
 
2
 
16
 
21
 
13
 
17
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 Table 2
 
Means and Standard Deviations of Demographic Variables
 
Father's Education (years) 

Mother's Education (years) 

Father's Gross Monthly
 
Income 

Mother's Gross Monthly
 
Income 

Age of Youngest Child in
 
Custody Disputes 

Age of Youngest Child Not
 
in Custody Disputes 

Court Appearances Initiated
 
by DV Fathers 

Violent Incidents After
 
Separation 

Father's Age 

Mother's Age 

DV = domestically violent
 
N
 
100 

100 

100 

100 

55 

45 

49 

49 

100 

100 

X SD 
12.9 1.7 
12.2 1.98 
2,049.92 1,341.58 
1,020.34 678.48 
5.67 4.22 
6.11 4.45 
1.96 1.87 
.96 1.7 
33.61 6.14 
30.72 6.01 
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Table 3
 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Violent vs,
 
Nonviolent Fathers Fiahtina for Custody
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Nonviolent
 
Fathers
 
Column
 
Total
 
Count
 
Expected Value
 
Residual
 
X2 (1) =16.22, E = 

Father
 
Fight
 
37
 
27.0
 
10.1
 
18
 
28.1
 
-10.1
 
55
 
55.0%
 
.00005.
 
Fathers
 
Don•t
 
Fight
 
12
 
22.1
 
-10.1
 
33
 
23.0
 
10.1
 
45
 
45.0%
 
Row
 
Total
 
49
 
49.0%
 
51
 
51.0%
 
100
 
100.0%
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Table 4
 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Violent vs.
 
Nonviolent Fathers Granted Custody
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Nonviolent
 
Fathers
 
Column
 
Total
 
Count
 
Expected Value
 
Residual
 
(1) = .12274, 

Fathers
 
Granted
 
Custody
 
16
 
15.2
 
.8
 
15
 
15.2
 
-.8
 
31
 
31.0%
 
.72608.
 
Fathers
 
Not Granted
 
Custody
 
33
 
33.8
 
-.8
 
36
 
33.8
 
.8
 
69
 
69.0%
 
Row
 
Total
 
49
 
49.0%
 
51
 
51.0%
 
100
 
100.0%
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Children's Aae as a Variable
 
A t test was performed on the data to test the
 
hypothesis that the older the youngest child is at the time
 
of the separation, the more likely the father would be to
 
fight for custodyi The age of the youngest children whose
 
fathers fought for custody (M =5.67) was not found to be
 
significantly higher than the ages of the youngest children
 
whose fathers did not fight for custody (M= 6.11),
 
t(94) = -.50, p = 617.
 
Sex of the Children in Custodial Disputes
 
A Chi-sguare analysis was run on the data to test the
 
hypothesis that violent fathers would be more likely to
 
fight for custody of male children than female children as
 
compared to nonviolent fathers when custody was contested.
 
Results which appear in Table 5 indicated a significant
 
relationship between the likelihood of violent fathers
 
fighting for custody of male children as compared to
 
nonviolent fathers, (1) = 21.243, p = .OOOO. As may be
 
seen from Table 5, violent fathers were more likely to fight
 
for custody of male children than were nonviolent fathers.
 
As Table 6 indicates, violent fathers were also more likely
 
than nonviolent fathers to fight for custody of female
 
children, x2 (1) =5,439^ _0T97.
 
Sex of Children in custodial Decisions
 
To test the hypothesis that violent fathers would be
 
.■ ■28 ■ 
Chi-square 	Analysis of the Number of Sons Involved in
 
Paternal Custodial Disputes: Violent vs. Nonviolent Fathers
 
For	 Don't Fight Row
 
For Total
 
40 ■ 9 49
 
Violent 28.3 20.7 50.5%
 
Fathers 2.2 -2.6
 
4S
16 ■ .: _.-:32 V
 
Violent 27.7 20.3 :>4,9»;5%­
Fathers 
-2.::2::; 2.6
 
Column 56 41 97
 
Total 57.7% 42.3% 100.0%
 
Count .
 
Expected Value
 
Standard Residua1
 
= 21.243, p = .0000
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 Table 6
 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Daughters Involved
 
Fathers
 
Domestically
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Nondomestically
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Column
 
Total
 
Count
 
Expected Value
 
Standard Residual
 
(1) = 5.439 E =
 
Fight
 
For
 
Custody
 
30
 
24.1
 
1.2
 
21
 
26.9
 
- -1.1
 
51
 
57.3%
 
.0197.
 
Don't Fight
 
For Custody
 
12
 
17.9
 
-1.4
 
26
 
20.1
 
1.3
 
38
 
42.7%
 
Row
 
Total
 
42
 
47.2%
 
47
 
52.8%
 
89
 
100.0%
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 more likely to be granted custody of male children as 
' i ■ 
compared to nonviolent fathers.when custody was contested, a 
Chi-square analysis was performed. Results which appear in 
Table 7 did not yield a significant relationship between the 
likelihood of violent fathers being granted custody of male 
children as compared to nonviolent fathers, (i) = 1.017, 
P = .3132. As may be seen from Table 7, violent fathers 
were not granted custody of male children significantly more 
than nonviolent fathers. As Table 8 indicates, violent 
fathers were just as likely as nonviolent fathers to be 
granted custody of daughters, x^ (1) = .0000, p = 1.000. 
Support in Arrears
 
A Chi-square analysis, which appears in Table 9, was
 
run on the data to test the hypothesis that fathers that are
 
domestically violent would be more likely to be in arrears
 
in support payments than fathers that are not domestically
 
violent. Results yielded a significant relationship between
 
violent fathers being in arrears in support payments,
 
X^ (1) = 12.14, p = .00049. As may be seen from Table 7,
 
violent fathers were significantly more likely to be in
 
arrears in support payments than nonviolent fathers.
 
Income as a Variable
 
A correlation matrix was run including the variables of
 
male's income, female's income, male's persistence, female's
 
persistence, and number of violent episodes since
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■■■Tatole; 7 ■ ■ 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Sons Involved in 
Paternal Custodial Decisions: 
Fathers 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Nondomestically
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Column
 
Total
 
Count 
Expected Value 
Standard Residual 
X2 (1) = 1.017, E = 
Fathers 
Winning 
Custody 
-' ■ ■ 'is") 
16.2 
■ ■ v" ;V-.7 
■ ■ 13 
15.8 
-.7 ; 
32 
33.0% 
.3132 
Violent vs. Nonviolent 
-
Fathers Not
 
Winning
 
Custody
 
30 
32.8 
■ ; 5;:'\ 
35 
32.2 
;yK -5. 
65 
67.0% 
Row 
Total 
49 
50.5% 
48 
49.5% 
97 
100.0% 
32 
  
:'Table-,,8- , • ■ 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Daughters Involved 
in Paternal Custodial Decisions: Violent vs. Nonviolent 
Fathers 
Fathfers 
Winning 
Custody 
Fathers Not 
Winning Row 
Total 
Domestically 
Violent 
Fathers 
15 
15.1 
27 
26.9 
42 
47.2% 
Violent 
Fathers 
: 17 
16.9 
" •0 
30 
30;1 
-•0 
47 
52.8% 
Column 
Total 
i2 
36.0% 
: 57 . 
64.0% 
89 
100.0% 
Count 
Expected Value 
Standard Residual 
(1) = .0000, E = 1.000. 
33
 
  
Table 9
 
Chi-sauare Analysis of the Number of Fathers in Arrears on
 
Support Payments; Violent vs. Nonviolent Fathers
 
Violent
 
Fathers
 
Nonyiblent
 
Fathers
 
Column
 
Total
 
Count 
Expected Value 
Residual 
Arrears
 
Yes
 
26
 
17.6 ■ 
8.4
 
10 ■ 
18.4
 
.■ ■.-8v4; 
/ 36 
36.0? 
Arrears 
No 
23 
'SI. 4 
8.4 
41^ 
32.6 
■ 8.4 
64 
64.0? 
Row 
Total 
49 
49.0% 
51 
51.0% 
100 
100.0% 
= 12.13847, p = .00049. 
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separation. A signifiGant correlation was found between
 
male's persistence and male's income. Table 10 displays the
 
correlation matrix, along with means and standard deviations
 
for each of the variables.
 
A second correlation matrix was run including the
 
variables of male's income, female's income, whether the
 
male was domestically violent, and male's persistence in
 
court. Table 11 displays the correlations between the
 
variables as well as the means and standard deviations for
 
each. ­
A stepwise regression was employed, entering domestic
 
violence on the first step with male's persistence as the
 
dependent variable. Table 12 presents the summary table
 
with the multiple R, , adjusted R^, F values, significant
 
F values, standardized regression coefficients, (B), and
 
correlations. On step one, R was significantly different
 
from zero, R = .51087, F (1,57) = 20.1298, p = .0000.
 
Whether the fathers were domestically violent was a
 
significant predictor of their persistence in court.
 
On step 2, male's income was entered, R was again found
 
to be significant, R = .5868, F (2,56) = 14.7039, p = .0000.
 
The male's income accounted for a significant additional,
 
independent amount of variance. Thus, the results indicate
 
that being a domestically violent male and male's income
 
each predicted male's persistence in court.
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Table 10
 
Correlation Matrix of Male's Income. Female's Income. Male's Persistence in Court.
 
Female's Persistence in Court, and Number of Violent Incidents After Separation
 
Male's
 
Persistence Male's Female's Female's Violent
 
Variables (DV) Income Income Persistence Episodes
 
Male's
 
Income .362
 
Female's
 
Income .054 -.232
 
Female's
 
OJ
 Persistence .291 .264 .154
 
a\
 
Violent
 
Episodes .107 .016 .020 .116
 
Mean 1.939 2266.47 1013.98 2.224 1.939
 
Standard
 
Deviation 1.875 1519.84 775.84 1.246
 
1.784
 
DV - Dependent Variable
 
 Table 11
 
Correlation Matrix of Domestic Violence. Male's Income.
 
Female's Income, and Male's Persistence
 
Variables
 
Domestic
 
Violence
 
Male's
 
Income
 
Female's
 
Income
 
Male's
 
Persistence
 
Mean
 
Standard
 
Deviation
 
Domestic
 
Violence
 
1.000
 
-.222
 
.011
 
-.511
 
.510
 
.502
 
Male's
 
Income
 
-.188
 
.395
 
2049.924
 
1341.557
 
R2 = .26099
 
Adjusted =
 
R = .51087
 
Female's 

Income 

-.006
 
1020.342
 
678.480
 
24802
 
Male's
 
Persistence
 
1.100
 
1.617
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Table 12
 
Summary Table of Stepwise Regression With Domestic Violence and Male's Income on Male's
 
Persistence in Court 
Step 
Multiple 
R R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Signif 
icant 
F 
Variable 
Beta 
In 
Corre 
lation 
.51087 .26099 .24802 20.1298 .0000 
IN: 
Domestic 
Violence -.51087 -.511 
.58679 .34432 .32091 14.70392 .0000 
IN: 
Male's 
Income .29610 .395 
U) 
00 
A3 X 2 ANOVA was run to determine if a significant
 
two-way interaction existed between whether the father was
 
domestically violent and the male's income level. Income
 
was separated into three groups: low average ($0 - $1750),
 
high average ($1751 - $4000), and high income ($4001 and
 
above). Although no significant two-way interaction was
 
found, F (1,64) = .001, E = .977, it is interesting to note
 
that every case (7 out of 7) of the high income ($4001 and
 
above) consisted of a domestically violent male fighting for
 
custody.
 
Violence as a Variable
 
A stepwise regression was run to test the hypothesis
 
that violent males earning a lower income would be more
 
likely to persist harassing their wives in physically
 
abusive ways after separation. Male's income, female's
 
income, male's persistence and female's persistence were run
 
with number of violent incidents since separation as the
 
dependent variable. No variables were allowed to be entered
 
due to .05 limits being reached. Therefore, violent
 
episodes did not contribute a significant amount of
 
variance. The hypothesis that violent males earning a lower
 
income would attempt to continue harassing their wives in
 
physically abusive ways was not supported.
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DISCUSSION
 
The present study was conducted to contribute to the
 
literature and provide data on the relationship between
 
paternal custody and domestic violence. The literature
 
fails to reveal any basic descriptive statistics on this
 
topic. Therefore, the present study will provide such data
 
for future reference and study.
 
The hypothesis that men who are domestically violent
 
would be more likely to fight for custody of their children
 
than those who are not domestically violent, was found to be
 
significant. This supports Chesler's (1986) assertion that
 
violent, misogynous men may actually be more likely to
 
institute custody battles as a control issue. This finding
 
also corresponds with the profile of the wife batterer as
 
needing to maintain dominance in the marital relationship
 
and his use of coercive power (Frieze, 1979; Straus, 1978;
 
Elbow, 1977).
 
The hypothesis that fathers who are domestically
 
violent would be more likely to win custody of their
 
children than fathers who are not domestically violent was
 
not supported. Although the results did not yield
 
significance, it is important to consider the fact that 16
 
violent fathers and 15 nonviolent fathers were awarded
 
custody of their children. It appears that having a history
 
of violent behavior does not greatly hinder a father's
 
chances of winning custody of his children.
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with regard the older the aige of
 
the youngest child at the time of separation, the more
 
likely it would be for fathers to fight for custody, no
 
support was found. This could be due to fathers having more
 
support systems available to them. Greater economic power
 
may allow them to hire help to care for their children.
 
Also, it is possible that these fathers have established a
 
relationship with another woman who is available to help
 
care for the children.
 
The hypothesis that violent fathers would be more
 
likely to fight for custody of male children than they would
 
for female children as compared to nonviolent fathers was
 
found to be significant. That custody is related to the
 
father's masculine power and control issues may be evident
 
in this finding. The results tend to support the assertion
 
by Chesler (1986) that violent fathers contesting custody
 
maintain a gender preference such that they are more
 
strongly motivated to fight for male children than female
 
children.
 
The hypothesis that violent fathers would be more
 
likely to win custody of male children than they would
 
female children as compared to nonviolent fathers was not
 
supported. In part, this may be due to the fact that the
 
current study included three different counties into the
 
data. In each county, the court determines its own type of
 
family mediation. The courts also differ in how strongly
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each judge considers recommendations made by family court
 
mediators. Therefore, the criteria used in custodial
 
determinations may vary to a great degree.
 
The hypothesis that fathers who are domestically
 
violent would be more likely to be in arrears in support
 
payments than nonviolent fathers was found to be
 
significant. This supports the findings by Chesler (1986)
 
in which she found that the majority of fathers (62% of
 
which were violent) fought for custody to avoid paying
 
support to their ex-wives and that they failed to pay child
 
or spousal support prior to winning custody. This also
 
supports the profile of the batterer as needing to maintain
 
control and dominate his spouse.
 
The fact that violent fathers are more likely to be in
 
arrears in support payments also supports the contention by
 
Goode (1971) such that power, control, and self-esteem are
 
rewards of family violence. Giving or withholding of
 
economic rewards or services is a method used to exert
 
influence. It could also be considered a method in which
 
batterers seek to get revenge with the spouse for leaving.
 
Additionally, this may be a way in which the abusive male
 
hopes to force his spouse to return to the relationship,
 
perceives himself regaining control of the situation, and
 
subsequently regaining some sense of self-worth.
 
The failing to support children apparently did not
 
reduce the chances of violent fathers winning custody of
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their children. In the present study, 21 of the 37 violent
 
fathers who fought for custody were in arrears in suppprt
 
payinents, whereas only two of the 18 nonviolent fathers who
 
fought for custody were in arrears in support payittents.
 
This clearly demonstrates that this is a control issue
 
restricted for the most part,; to abusive relationships. As
 
indicated in the literature (Frieze, 1979; Straus, 1978;
 
Elbow, 1977), the abusive man maintains a need to dominate
 
and uses coercive power in order to do so.
 
The hypothesis that violent fathers that earn higher
 
incomes would be more likely to persist in initiating court
 
appearances was found to be significant. The violent male•s
 
income significantly predicted his persistence in initiating
 
court appearances. This supports the results by Luepnitz
 
(1982) in which sole and joint custodial fathers fought
 
long, hard, and bitterly to win custody and had higher
 
incomes. It also supports Chesler (1986) in which economic
 
power allowed fathers to maintain persistence in their legal
 
battles for an extensive period of time. In the present
 
study, custodial disputes lasted a mean duration of 2.7
 
years with the mean gross monthly income of the males being
 
$2050 and the females mean gross monthly income being $1020.
 
The fact that battered women in the study had
 
substantially lower incomes than their husbands could be
 
related to control. As indicated by the literature
 
(Chesler, 1986; Roy, 1977; Straus, 1978), men who abuse ;
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their wives tend to maintain traditipnal gender stereotypes.
 
Therefore, they would not be likely to tolerate their wives
 
competing with them in the bread winner role. As a
 
consequence, it is highly probable that most battered women
 
earning minimal incomes find themselves at a significant
 
disadvantage in a court of law when opposed by husbands
 
whose incomes are substantially higher.
 
When considering the issue of the prevalence of :
 
domestic violence in the general population, the current
 
study, although a sample consisting of married couples from
 
three Southern California Counties, resulted in a 49%
 
incidence rate (49 out of 100 cases involved domestic
 
violence) The majority of these cases involving domestic
 
violence (41 cases) reported a history of violence
 
throughout the lifetime of the marriage. This history of
 
violence was documented by declarations, police reports,
 
physicians* records, documentation of hospital emergency
 
room treatment, witnesses' declarations and depositions.
 
The 49% figure found in this study supports the 50%
 
estimates made by Walker (1979); Straus, Gelles, and
 
Steinmetz (1980); as well as the 50% reported rate of
 
Levenger (1965). Although a small sample, this study did
 
not include any other type of cohabitating relationships.
 
Therefore, couples living together out of marriage were
 
excluded. The entire population of women seeking temporary
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restraining orders for protection from an abusive boyfriend
 
were not considered in the results.
 
The results of the present study suggest that fathers
 
who have a history of violence, earning a substantial
 
income, continue to harass their ex-wives by involving them
 
in long-term custodial disputes due to their greater earning
 
power. Because having a history of violent behavior does
 
not significantly decrease their chances of winning custody
 
of their children, these fathers are reinforced by the court
 
system for their persistence and they are successful, with
 
the help of the court system, in maintaining control of
 
their ex-wives and children to a great extent.
 
Battered women leave a violent relationship hoping to
 
break free of the control and domination of their batterers,
 
only to face them in a court system that ignores, if not
 
actually sanctioning, this abusive pattern of behavior.
 
This may be why many battered women drop dissolution
 
proceedings and return to a violent relationship. They may
 
perceive themselves as being able to exert more control over
 
the situation by returning than they are able to do in a
 
court of law in which the patriarchal mind set continues to
 
reward violent men for their endeavors.
 
The results of the present study appear to support
 
Chesler's (1986) assertion that a different standard is
 
applied to parental behavior of mothers and fathers. A
 
woman that leaves a marital relationship without taking her
 
children with her is apparently treated differently by the
 
court system than is the father under similar circumstances.
 
This differential treatment may be due to the court system
 
perceiving the mother as deviant if she leaves without her
 
children. In the present study, in only two out of 13 cases
 
when the woman originally left home without her children,
 
was she eventually able to later get awarded primary
 
physical custody.
 
In one instance, the court initially gave custody to
 
the father. Five years later, custody of the 16 year old
 
daughter was changed to the mother at the daughter's
 
request. The daughter had alleged that the father had been
 
taking her earnings and some of her jewelry. At this point,
 
the father began proceedings to gain custody of his other
 
two children, a 15 year old daughter and a 14 year old son.
 
Proceedings went off calendar and were never pursued.
 
The other case involved a mother that left the home
 
without her two children (six year old daughter and three
 
year old son) and was initially awarded joint physical
 
custody. When the husband learned that she was living in a
 
lesbian relationship, he went back into court and asked for
 
sole physical custody and was granted this. The mother went
 
into court several times over the next five years, concerned
 
about the father maltreating the children, to no avail.
 
Eventually, after psychological evaluations of the father,
 
mother, children, and the mother's partner (the father was
 
46
 
remarried, but the new spouse was not required to undergo
 
evaluation), several incidents of documented abuse to the
 
children, several statements by the children's neighbors,
 
teachers, etc., and a suicide attempt by the daughter, the
 
court awarded the mother primary physical custody.
 
In contrast, of the fathers that were granted custody,
 
18 of them did not maintain physical custody of the children
 
initially when the couples separated. Instead, they were
 
later granted physical custody.
 
Therefore, these facts reveal that it is much more
 
difficult for a mother to be granted physical custody of her
 
children if she does not maintain physical custody of her
 
children at the time the couple separates. This can be very
 
devastating to a woman who has had to flee the home for fear
 
of her life, unable to take the children with her. Upon
 
finding refuge, she then goes to court in order to get
 
protection orders as well as custody orders for the children
 
and finds that because she left the home without them, the
 
court interprets this as a lack of her interest in the
 
children. In some instances, a woman is not able to take
 
the children because the man threatens to kill her if she
 
takes them or he may physically hold them from her.
 
Chesler (1986, p. 86) referred to the disparity in our
 
society's definitions of a "good enough" mother and a "good
 
enough" father. A mother who leaves a relationship without
 
her children for whatever reasons is perceived as deviant
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and unfit, wher^^ a father that leases a relationship
 
without his children and later comes in to fight for custody
 
is seen by the court system as credible. A "good enough"
 
father spends a great deal less time with his children and
 
is not able or agreeable to do what is expected physically
 
of a "good enough" mother to maintain family life. Even a
 
father who beats his wife and withholds child support is
 
apparently as likely to be seen as a "good enough" father
 
and still has a 50/50 chance of winning custody.
 
Rather than just looking at each of the results
 
independently, it is of greater value to maintain a Gestalt
 
perspective of the findings that emerged from the present
 
study. Although he may not always be successful, the
 
results indicate that a man with a violent history is
 
demonstrating a consistent pattern of attempting to maintain
 
control and to dominate his spouse after separation. He is
 
more likely to fight for custody of his children than a
 
nonviolent father. It could also be interpreted that a
 
violent father prefers to spend his money on attorney's fees
 
by initiating court appearances rather than pay court-

ordered child support to his ex-spouse. It is also
 
important to consider the fact that the male who is
 
persistent is receiving intermittent reinforcement for his
 
actions. He is successfully harassing his ex-wife by
 
keeping her tied up in court hearings and draining her
 
financially and psycholpgically. She is unable to focus on
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healing herself or working with her children on the
 
unresolved issues of their violent history. She is also not
 
receiving the court-ordered support that would help to get
 
her on her feet and she is making substantially less income
 
to suppprt her family than she was previously when living
 
with her spouse. It is no wonder that women and children
 
have a difficult adjustment time after a marital separation.
 
In contrast, a father with a violent history can leave
 
the relationship without his children, fail to support them
 
after he leaves, and yet pursue custody in court, and he is
 
still as likely as a nonviolent father that is paying court-

ordered support to be granted custody of his children. What
 
comes forth from the results of the study is the perpetual
 
existence of a problem of equity. A mother's character is
 
much more strongly scrutinized by a court of law than is a
 
father's. The courts need to recognize these issues of
 
control and acknowledge that the welfare of the children is
 
not the primary concern of violent fathers persisting in
 
custodial disputes.
 
Conclusions ;
 
It is my conclusion from the results of the present
 
study that the cycle of violence does not end when the
 
abused woman leaves the relationship. Instead, it is merely
 
moved to a new setting with different methods of violence
 
employed. By applying Mack's (1989) revision of Deschner's
 
(1984) cycle of violence, one can observe a patternof
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violence with dpinestically yioient fat^^ fighting for
 
custody. Custody battles against battered women are merely
 
a variation of the chronic violence they have endured during
 
the relationship.
 
After the primitive rage, the woman leaves the abuser.
 
This ignites feelings of rejection and abandonment within
 
him which fuels his anger and moves him to strike out at his
 
spouse who has left him. If he has the financial resources,
 
he seeks consolation by exploiting the court system. He
 
thereby institutes a custody battle in order to strike fear
 
into the abused partner, hoping to regain his control.
 
As Goode (1971) proposed, the batterer utilizes the 
major sets of resources available to him to induce the 
spouse to return. By withholding of economic rewards 
(child/spousal support) and the threat of force (a custody 
battle), he hopes to effectively regain his control over the 
spouse. ■ 
As maintained by Goode (1971), chronic violence tends
 
to wear victims to the point in which they will do anything
 
to appease the batterer and avoid further violence.
 
Battered women, custodially embattled, are worn down
 
psychologically and financially by the batterer. Some women
 
may return to the relationship at some point in order to
 
appease the abuser and stop the violence. Other women may
 
forfeit property and other assets to the abuser as a way to
 
negotiate maintaining custody. In addition, some battered
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women may sacrifice full custody and agree to joint custody
 
hoping to assuage the abuser's violence.
 
Seeing her wear down, along with reinforceraent from the
 
court system, the abuser is rewarded, not only by the gain
 
in power and control, but self-esteem as well. Maintaining
 
control increases his sense of power and self-worth.
 
The abuser is also rewarded by revenge. He perceives
 
his masculinity and self-worth threatened by his loss of
 
power and abandonment by his spouse and children. The
 
abuser therefore seeks and realizes revenge against his
 
spouse through the court.
 
The court system needs to be more aware of the issues
 
of control in relationships involving a history of domestic
 
violence and consider the reasons violent fathers are
 
persisting in custodial battles rather than giving these men
 
intermittent reinforcement for their behavior. To what
 
degree does the court system encourage battered women to
 
return to a violent relationship and also discourage other
 
women from leaving, knowing they will relinquish all control
 
to a court system that is unsympathetic and ignorant of the
 
underlying need of the abuser to be dominant, camouflaged by
 
a growing sentiment of presumption/preference in custodial
 
decision? .
 
Judges and court mediators need more extensive training
 
in the area of domestic violence with emphasis on the
 
underlying issue of control. By applying the cycle of
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violence to violent men custodially challenging their wives,
 
and training those involved in family lav, the true motives
 
of violent fathers would be more apparent. In addition, the
 
courts would cease viewing the mother's concerns as lack of
 
cooperation. By enlightening all involved, the courts would
 
benefit by a reduction in caseload. Women and children
 
would benefit by escaping the cycle of violence and could
 
work toward healing themselves.
 
Suggestions for Future Research
 
Although the current study was able to establish a
 
pattern of domestic violence and paternal custodial
 
disputes,, it was based solely on information gathered from
 
dissolution of marriage files. Important pieces of the
 
puzzle are sometimes left out of court files. Such
 
information might consist of results of a family mediation
 
meeting, results of psychological evaluations, or various
 
coercive techniques the abuser may employ to force his
 
spouse to settle for less than she initially planned.
 
Therefore, further studies based on first-person interviews
 
of couples custodially embattled could include this valuable
 
information.
 
The courts nqw consider child support and custody
 
separate issues. They do so in order to protect the rights
 
of low-income parents and to avoid the possibility of the
 
custodial parent holding the child for ransom.
 
Unfortunately, by separating these issues, the courts remain
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ignorant of the tactic of withholding support that is
 
employed by abusive men in order to control an ex-spouse.
 
One couid truly fill in a great deal of the missing
 
pieces by inGbrporating the information taken from
 
dissolution of marriage files with what is gathered from
 
first-person interviews. Future studies could randomly
 
choose dissolution of marriage files, extract the
 
information available and also interview both parties to get
 
a much clearer picture of the dynamics involved.
 
It is ironic that family court mediators often have
 
available to them information on violence in the family.
 
Yet they may lack the expertise or interest to identify the
 
underlying issues of control that are at the heart of the
 
myriad of disputed issues when domestic violence is
 
involved. Training of family court mediators on the
 
dynamics of domestic violence would be valuable to the
 
family court system by enhancing their ability to deal
 
effective with these complex and frustrating cases.
 
An additional suggestion for future research would be
 
to investigate the serendipitous finding that all of the
 
high income males in this randomly selected sample were
 
violent fathers fighting for custody. Obviously this
 
suggest a systematic syndrome and it would be of great
 
interest and benefit to the literature to determine what
 
dynamics are at work.
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